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An East and West Divide or Convergence? 
Similarities between Ancient Indian and Greek Philosophy 
on Human Flourishing 
SHILP A R. SHARMA 
Institute of Education, University of London 
There is a common assumption that the ancient philosophies of Greece and India 
are vastly different; the former conceived of as more 'logical', the latter as more 
(mystical '. Any parallels between the two civilisations are often attributed to 
Plato or Pre-Socratic thinkers, who are considered to be (more eastern' in their 
outlook. This paper will assess the aforementioned assumption by examining 
basic ideas about human flourishing in both cultures. What does it mean to (live 
well' and how is this related to (happiness'? These are basic questions underlying 
most conceptions of human flourishing. In this paper I will examine these 
questions with specific reference to Plato, Aristotle and ancient Indian 
philosophical thought, and will draw attention to particular implications of this 
investigation. 
There is a common supposition that the ancient philosophies of Greece and India are 
vastly different; the former conceived of as more 'logical', the latter as more 
'mystical' (for example, see Guthrie, 1965; Dodds, 1951). In his introduction to A 
History of Philosophy: Volume 1, Greece and Rome, Copleston asserts that: 
this philosophy of the Greeks was really their own achievement, the fruit of their 
own vigour and freshness of mind, just as their literature and art were their own 
achievement. We must not allow the laudable desire of taking into account 
possible non-Greek influence to lead us to exaggerate the importance of that 
influence and to underestimate the originality of the Greek mind (Copleston, 
1946, p. 11). 
In, other words, though we can and should accept that the Greeks' profound work 
influenced the ideas of many others, it seems implausible to suggest that they 
themselves were influenced by any group. 
Copleston's observation is not uncommon among scholars. Two decades later, 
Guthrie stated 'The motives and methods of the Indian schools, and the theological 
and mystical background of their thought, are so utterly different from those of the 
Greeks that there is little profit in the comparison' (Guthrie, 1965, p. 53). 
Any parallels between the two civilisations· are often attributed to Plato or Pre-
Socratic thinkers, who are considered to be 'more eastern' in their outlook. This paper 
challenges the aforementioned assumptions, and in the subsequent sections I will 
show that there are striking similarities between ancient Indian and Greek 
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philosophies, some of which will. be outlined in this paper. Specifically, I will 
examine works of Plato and Aristotle, as well as Indian philosophy, in relation to the 
idea of human flourishing, and will briefly identify some implications of these 
similarities. 
A NOTE ON THE USE OF THE TERM 'INDIAN' PHILOSOPHY 
It is necessary to explain the term 'Indian' philosophy, as it will be used throughout 
this work. In discussing ancient Indian philosophy, I am referring to a large body of 
philosophies, which dominated Indian thought from the Vedic Period through the 
Epics of the Ramayana and Mahabharata to various 'schools' of thought such as the 
Samkhya and Yoga, and perhaps, some Buddhist thought. These periods range from 
1500 B.C.-200 A.D., though these dates are at best, very rough estimations, as the 
writings themselves were continuous sets of thought, which remained un-authored, 
and largely undated. As Radhakrishnan writes, '... so unhistorical, or perhaps so 
ultra-philosophical, was the nature of the ancient Indian, that we know more about the 
philosophies than about the philosophers' (Radhakrishnan, 1999, p. 57). This is 
perhaps a mark of Indian philosophy; that is, its reverence for and emphasis upon 
'truths' and ideas rather than for the ephemeral bodies who expounded them. All these 
philosophies, barring Buddhism, either accept as authority, derive from, or 
complement the most ancient philosophical texts in India, the Vedas, which are 
sometimes referred to as ancient 'Hindu' scriptures. It may seem that the discussion is 
dominated by 'Hindu' texts, but the emphasis on ancient Indian philosophy suggests 
that the discussion will centre around a particular period of time; the 'ancient' 
philosophies of India were primarily (what is now referred to as) 'Hindu' philosophy. 
SIMILARITIES 
Regardless of whether they are considered to be coincidence 1 or conscious 2 , 
McEvilley observes that there is an array of parallel between Indian and Greek 
thought, (McEvilley, 2002, p. xx). Yet, most thinkers don't actually appear convinced 
by any such links, even though Plato's ideas are frequently considered to have more 
of a 'spiritual element', (with comparison to Aristotle). Instead, it is speculated that 
Plato's influence naturally came from the Pythagorean's.3 Though the philosophical 
foundations of this group will not be discussed in detail, for the purposes of this work, 
it is significant to acknowledge that 'for the Pythagoreans philosophy was tied up 
with a way of life, and intellectual endeavour was connected to an ideal of fulfilment. 
Their values included such typically Greek values as limit, moderation and order ... ' 
(Barrow, 2007, p. 20). Barrow's observation is important for one particular reason: 
that being that although the ideas of the Pythagorean's were more mystical in nature, 
their ideas were still representative of 'typically Greek values'. In other words, their 
ideas weren't a 'drop of alien blood in Greek veins,' as it has been wrongly alleged 
(Rohde cited in McEvilley, 2002, p. 338). This is a crucial shift from those that 
believe that there are particular philosophers within the Greek tradition that are 'more 
Greek' than others. Though it seems reasonable to deduce that one may never know 
for certain the particular influences upon Plato's thinking, Barrow rightly admits that 
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working this out 'is a matter of interpreting and extrapolating from his own texts ... ' 
(Barrow, 2007, p. 13). This will be done in the sections below. 
SOME ASSUMPTIONS 
As in any philosophical tradition, there are particular claims put forth, which are later 
established as axioms. These claims and the concepts they encompass are thoroughly 
detailed and complex; encompassing rich ideas and arguments which entire theses 
could be dedicated. This is very much the case for the notion of 'human flourishing'. 
One could dedicate an entire thesis to the idea of 'human flourishing'; a thorough 
examination into ancient Greek and Indian philosophies on the concept is no doubt a 
complex task which is beyond the scope of this paper. So for the. purposes of this 
work, I will establish a few basic points concerning the notion of 'human flourishing'; 
I will make these assumptions explicit below. 
F or one, although there is often emphasis placed upon the differences in the 
philosophies of Aristotle and Plato, there are also fundamental similarities. 4 More 
specifically, I take for granted that the two shared basic teleological and metaphysical 
views about human beings, such as the idea that there is structure to the world 'which 
exists independently of human opinion or desire' (Wild, 1960, p. 74). The two (Plato 
and Aristotle) share the teleological view that all humans endeavour to obtain 
'happiness' (eudaimonia), and that the performance of actions is a means of achieving 
'happiness'. In this way, both thinkers set out to outline the best sort of life worth 
living; for, they both take for granted that human flourishing consists in leading a 
good life, and that a person who leads a 'good life' is 'happy'. Hence, they both 
emphasise that a person's 'way of life' largely determines whether or not she 
flourishes (Plato, 1993, 353d-e; Aristotle, 1925, NE 1.4 1095aI8). For this reason, 
much time is spent on looking at the 'path' that a person should follow in order to 
secure happiness: the 'good life'. 
So far the above can be said to be in line with ancient Indian philosophy. Most 
Indian philosophers consider there to be one ultimate 'end', at which all activities 
aim. However, unlike Aristotle and Plato, the ancient Indians emphasised that though 
the 'goal' may be one, there are many ways to reach it. And so, they talk about three 
particular 'paths' which are known as jnana Yoga, karma Yoga, bhakti Yoga, 
representing the path of knowledge, the path of action and the path of devotion, 
respectively. Hence a person's life and duties are very much shaped by this path. 
Accordingly, there isn't one 'good life', nor is anyone path superior to the others.5 
The final assumption above is a deviation from both Plato and Aristotle, who 
despite their fundamental similarities emphasised two different paths; arguing that the 
good life consisted in either the life of activity or the life of contemplation. Indian 
philosophy, on the other hand, acknowledges that people often differ in their beliefs, 
habits, understandings, etc, and so with such a variety of people, there cannot be a 
'one size fits all' path which underscores a good life. 
Much emphasis has been placed upon establishing the best 'path' that a pursuant 
of happiness ought to tread: is a life of deep philosophical contemplation inferior to a 
life of active service to mankind? This paper will not assess this, for, although there 
are many theories on the best sort of life that one should live, there is perhaps a more 
fundamental element of human flourishing within these ancient philos~hies which is 
often overlooked: that, ones 'way of life' is determined by one's psyche . 
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THE GUNASANDTHEPSYCHE 
In the Republic Plato gives a lot of importance to the divisions within the psyche, 
claiming that they are fundamental to understanding dikaiosone (righteousness) (see 
Plato, 1993, 353d-e). Closely studying ancient Greek and Indian texts, McEvilley 
observes that Plato's tripartite notion of the psyche presented in the Republic (439c-
441a) (which is parallel to the divisions within society) is similar to the idea of the 
three Gunas (a Sanskrit word which connotes 'qualities' or 'attributes') described by 
various Indian schools of thought (McEvilley, 2002).7 Plato describes the rational, 
passionate and appetitive elements, which McEvilley purports corresponds in Indian 
tradition, to the sattvic, rajasic and tamasic elements of the 'human personality' (p. 
182).8 
At the most basic level, the Gunas represent the characteristics of purity (sattva), 
activity (rajas), lethargy (tamas) (Raju, 1960). However, these aren't by any means 
meant to be direct translations of the concepts, as they are identified using various 
descriptions. They can primarily be distinguished as follows: sattva is that which 
provides illumination and is closely associated with concepts such as 'purity', 
'harmony', 'goodness'; rajas is considered to be the passionate element, which brings 
about restlessness, and outward movement; tamas represents the element of sloth and 
is related to concepts such as dullness and inertia (Radhakrishnan, 1948; Raju, 1960). 
Of importance to this paper is the relationship between the Gunas and human 
beings. As with other types of 'matter' or creation, it is theorised that humans also 
contain the Gunas and that humans are, to a certain extent, 'bound' by them. That is, 
who you are and the type of life you lead is said to be the result of the interaction 
between the Gunas (Radhakrishnan, 1999). The Bhagavadgftii explicitly outlines the 
significance of these qualities in human life; the Gunas take on an ethical sense, with 
sattva translated as 'goodness', rajas as 'passion' and tamas as 'dullness' 
(Radhakrishnan, 1948, p. 316). Interestingly, sattva appears to be given preference as 
a means to happiness, followed by rajas, and with a note of caution on the tamasic 
element. Of significance, we are not told to get 'rid of the tamasic element, but rather 
to 'rise above' the limitations of this quality; this may be due to the belief that one 
cannot dispose of any of these elements as they are the basic constituents of one's 
nature. 
Although McEvilley (2002) explains that the Gunas are similar to the divisions of 
the psyche which Plato describes in his Republic, this might be misleading. For, the 
Gunas aren't aspects that develop out of a soul or human life, and they aren't 
particular to human beings. And so, it isn't the case that because there is a 'soul' 
therefore there are Gun as , rather these qualities are said to exist in all forms of 
matter.9 Nonetheless, an examination into Plato's discussion of the three faculties and 
the Gunas make the similarities between the Indian and Greek notions more 
apparent. IO For one, Plato would have agreed that the way in which a person leads her 
life is very much determined by these faculties. For this reason, he places much 
importance on these three elements, arguing that dikaiosone and other virtues are 
determined by ones 'state of mind' (see Waterfield, 1993, p. xxxvi). Plato also 
indicates that a person can be, to a certain extent, controlled by a particular faculty, 
'And we know that anyone whose predilection tends strongly in a single direction has 
correspondingly less desire for other things' (Plato, 1993, 485d), in the same way that 
the Gila explains that one of the elements may dominate over the other two. II This 
point is significant as it underpins part of Plato's educational ideal: that it ought to 
strengthen the 'rational' faculty. For, if there is a particular element that is considered 
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to be of great consequence, it would seem logical that Plato emphasises the education 
of this particular element. And similar to the Gita, Plato stresses the importance of the 
'rational' faculty, insisting that it should dominate, followed by the 'passionate' 
element, and that if this happens, then the desirous/appetitive element will fall under 
the command of these. Waterfield explains Plato's underlying position here: 'people 
must be prevented from feeding their baser parts too often' (Waterfield, 1993, p. 
xxxviii). 
Though, that is not to say that a person should depend entirely upon one aspect 
alone, as the three elements are qualities that all beings need, to a certain extent. That 
is, the three elements serve different purposes: tamas longs to satisfy the appetite, 
rajas is motivated into action and dedication, while the element of sattva guides a 
person towards goodness and intellectual knowledge. Accordingly, one particular 
element cannot replace another, as all have to be harnessed towards the betterment of 
the individual. So, for example, if a person is particularly led by sattva, it is not 
necessarily to her benefit to subdue or ignore the other two facets; if she ignores her 
appetitive element, she may end up starving herself of food and water, under the 
pretext that she is 'overcoming' these desires. But it is important to point out that 
neither Plato nor the Bhagavadgftii endorse such an extreme ascetic lifestyle. 
If the elements are neither meant to be eradicated nor to be fully relied upon, then 
what is the proper use of them? McEvilley explains that 'the soul is to arrive at an 
inner balance of its three elements in which reason dominates, ambition serves reason, 
and the appetites are submissive, lacking fuel to fire them up' (McEvilley, 2002, p. 
186). He shows how Patanjali's12 explanation of the 'mind', as dependent upon the 
interaction between the three Gunas, also correlates to Plato's view above: 'The 
nature of the mind's activity depends on how the three qualities are interacting ... The 
opposing qualities-rqjas, activity, and tamas, passivity-are finally brought, through 
austerities and ethiCal practices, into balance in which reason (sattva) is the ruling 
element' (ibid.). 
IMPERTURBABILITY 
The Bhagavadgltii theorises that ideally, a person should move beyond the pull and 
attachment to the Gunas. The metaphysical point being made here is that a person 
isn't simply these three qualities; she is something 'more' than this, and the realisation 
of this point as well as the dissociation to these three faculties allows a person to 
achieve happiness. One need not accept the metaphysical claims in order to appreciate 
the practical point being made: that the highest good for a person is to lead a life 
where she isn't a slave to her emotions, desires (even the 'desire' for 'goodness'), 
whims, etc. This notion is often referred to as imperturbability, and reveals another 
similarity between Indian and Greek philosophy. The concept of imperturbability13 
relates to a particular attitude 'which regards with the same emotion or valuation 
those events which are to one's personal worldly advantage-such as pleasures and 
fulfilled intentions-and those which are not-such as pains and frustrated intentions' 
(McEvilley, 2002, p. 595). An examination into Indian philosophy readily reveals the 
importance placed upon this notion. 14 This concept is closely aligned with the theory 
of the Gunas; it is suggested that if these three elements were in balance with each 
other then imperturbability would ensue. 
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Think of this one point ... Man is happy at one time, miserable at another. He is 
afraid one moment and courageous at another. Why? Because he is shaped by the 
Gunas. They alone can transform man from one phase to another like this ... It is 
always out of balance (Bhagawan Sri Sathya Sai Baba, 2002, p. 241). 
The suggestion being put forth here is that one ought to maintain a state of 'internal' 
equanimity by getting beyond the fluctuations of life; this can easily be interpreted as 
imperturbability. Similarly, Waterfield explains that in the Republic, dikaiosone 
involves 'harmony or concord between the three parts of the mind under the rule of 
reason' (Waterfield, 1993, p. xxxix). 
It was suggested above that the notion of imperturbability is fairly uncontroversial 
in Indian philosophy, but interestingly enough, McEvilley suggests that this was the 
case for Greek philosophers as well, and that this stance corresponds to the Greek 
notion of ataraxia (McEvilley, 2002, p. 595). However, McEvilley claims that 
Aristotle doesn't necessarily endorse imperturbability, as this conflicts with Aristotle's 
idea that people should perform actions with 'full-feeling'; in particular, McEvilley 
notes that 'he does not recommend that his students attempt to extirpate the passions' 
(p. 600). But there are several assumptions being made here that need to be looked at 
more carefully. For one, McEvilley wrongly assumes that imperturbability 
automatically entails that one become indifferent to life. He considers this as a 
'transcendentalist approach', in which one becomes 'dead to this world', and 
associates this with Platonism, Neoplatonism, the Vedanta and schools of Mahayana 
Buddhism (p. 596). Yet, there are many examples, in particular within Plato's 
Republic, which suggest that a person be fully engaged in 'this life'. The suggestion 
which is made both in Plato's Republic as well as in the Gita is that a person ought to 
live in a spirit of lifelong service to their community; and that one's duties should 
always be fulfilled with the benefit of others in mind (Plato, 1993, 519c-520d, 540a-
b). These points suggest that these thinkers aren't concerned with creating a society of 
ascetics who live in the forest, dissociated from the world; on the contrary it seems 
these views endorse an altruistic vision of human flourishing which is very much 
based in the world we live in. 
Another assumption that McEvilley makes is that imperturbability demands the 
complete eradication of passions, and for this reason he says that Aristotle would not 
have endorsed this. However, within the doctrine of the Gunas, it is acknowledged 
that one cannot get rid of rajas (the passionate element). The 'passionate' element is 
an important facet; it is what stirs a person into action. Plato gives importance to this 
element with his insistence that it be 'properly educated' so as to be in balance with a 
person's 'rational' element (or what in Indian philosophy is identified as sattva). 
Accordingly, it is not that the passions are to be discarded; rather they are channelled 
into productivity. Aristotle would have most certainly agreed with this view, 
indicating that the passions need not be cast aside, but they do need to be modified 
(Nussbaum, 1994, p. 78). Hence these so-called 'differing' views are actually in line 
with one another. 
One implication of this view is that Aristotle and Plato, as well as those Indian 
philosophers who endorsed the theory of the Gunas felt that an action should be 
performed with 'full-feeling'. However, McEvilley (2002) seems to imply that the 
notion of 'full-feeling' is something that is particular to Aristotle. This misperception 
might be rooted in the idea that Aristotle emphasised that one should express 
'emotion,15 whereas Plato supposedly endorsed the view that emotions should be 
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suppressed. This assumption is misleading, though. For one, Aristotle didn't endorse a 
view of a person who was 'emotional' (in the narrow sense). 16 For, there is a 
difference between expressing an emotion and being emotional. Whereas, Aristotle 
views emotions as 'essential forces motivating to virtuous action,' he also 
acknowledges that emotions aren't always correct, and that above all else, they need 
to be guided by 'reason' (Nussbaum, 1994, pp. 94-96). And so expressing emotion, 
where one's higher faculty sees fit, is different from 'being emotional' which is often 
considered to be unnecessary or irrational. For this reason, we are told that the 
passionate or rajasic element within us must fall into line with the rational or sattvic 
element. Hence the notion of 'full-feeling' doesn't mean that one ought to perform an 
action with a full bout of emotions, but rather, whatever work one undertakes, the 
three elements are in harmony with that. Consequently, it seems as though Aristotle 
wouldn't have rejected the notion of imperturbability. 
IMPLICATIONS 
An important point that one can make with more certainty, is that this paper debunks 
the myth that Indian or 'Oriental' philosophy is more mystical and therefore poles 
apart from ancient Greek philosophy. 
In response to the nineteenth-century imperialist view that the western tradition is 
logical, the eastern mystical, this investigation has shown that every mystical 
element in Indian thought can be found in Greek thought too, and every rational 
element in Greek thought can be found in Indian (McEvilley, 2002, p. 643).17 
Cooper makes a similar observation, that 'there is no serious account of perception 
familiar to Western readers ... which ·was not developed in one or another Indian 
system' (Cooper, 1996, p. 14). 
Translation and interpretation of ancient texts could benefit from a wider 
consultation of sources, if one truly endeavours to 'find meaning'. For example, 
Aristotle places a lot of emphasis on the notion of logos, particularly as a unique 
function of humans. Though it is translated as 'rational principle' ,'rule', 'argument', 
'reasoning', Ross admits that of all the frequently occurring words in the Ethics, logos 
is the hardest to translate, (Ross, 1925, p. 4). He explains that tho1Jgh 'reason' was 
often an accepted translation of the word, he says it is 'quite clear' that this word isn't 
meant to represent the faculty of reason, but rather something 'grasped by reason', 
(ibid.). Though there is clearly a level of scholarship involved in the translation of 
ancient Greek, and perhaps the more confident translations have provided a deeper 
understanding into Aristotle's ideas, it seems odd that there is a general acceptance to 
such translations. Particularly, when such translations are embedded within cultures 
and ideologies; it is important to remember that these translations are, to a certain 
extent interpretations, and that it is quite difficult to make sense of such work, 
flawlessly. I suggest that further investigation into Indian philosophy could lend itself 
to understanding this concept of logos, as well as other concepts related to the good 
life. 
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One particular implication from the work presented in this paper is that the Greeks 
as well as the Indians emphasised that 'who we are' determines the type of life we 
lead; an individual's flourishing is largely related to her psyche, to something internal. 
This observation is contrary to the claim that human flourishing largely consists in 
securing particular external goods; it implies that happiness, or a good life, is not one 
that is dictated by the outside world. Rather, it is something which is under the control 
of each individual; it is related to ones inner being. This is one strong implication 
from the work presented in this paper. What's more, if each individual is in control of 
her own 'good life', then what about the so-called relationship between luck and 
happiness? 
Though these are just a few observations, surely the study of ancient Indian 
philosophy could conceivably enhance the study of ancient Greek philosophy, and 
future work in the study of the two could address many of the interesting points listed 
above. 
NOTES 
As it was mentioned in the previous section, many thinkers, be it out of genuine uncertainty or 
blind rejection, would consider similarities to be happenstance (for example, see Radhakrishnan, 
1999, pp. 23-24). 
2 McEvilley (2002) cites M. L. West's Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient as uncovering an 
ideological connection between the two civilisations, writing: 'This single instance of a rigorous 
scholarly proof demonstrates that philosophical doctrines were in fact travelling between India and 
Greece in the pre-Socratic period. Prior to West's book that premise, however plausible, remained 
hypothetical, but it now must be taken as established ... ' (McEvilley, 2002, p. xxxi). 
3 For example, Barrow writes, 'There is also an unmistakably spiritual side to Plato's thought and 
this too may owe something directly to Pythagorean theory, even while it's clearly distinct from it' 
(Barrow, 2007, p. 19). 
4 As Wild rightly observes, 'We cannot ignore the fact that Aristotle was nurtured during his 
formative years in a definitely Platonic atmosphere, with which he was intensely sympathetic. He 
reached his own position gradually through a careful and searching criticism of the ideas of his 
master. But the basic notions are the same' (Wild, 1960, p. 74). 
5 That is not to say that there aren't theories about which path is the best. Also, to say that there 
isn't a solitary conception of 'human flourishing' is not to say that there isn't a particular way to 
achieve flourishing. In other words, though people may 'flourish' differently, depending on their 
chosen path, there might still be a primary means by which they 'flourish'. This will be discussed 
further below. 
6 Also psuche, psukhe, psykhe. 
7 McEvilley (2002) attributes this observation to Marlow (1954). 
8 Wadia acknowledges that Dr. Urwickin his Message of Plato also made this link between the 
faculties in Plato's philosophy with the gunas in Indian philosophy (Wadia, 1953, p. 65). 
9 Though, this may also be the case with Plato. 
10 Though, not everyone seems convinced by this. Wadia (1953) claims that the Indian concepts are 
'more ethical' than Plato's concepts; though, what he means by this isn't entirely clear. For, the 
very purpose of describing the elements of the psyche is to talk about the 'right use' of it, and the 
relationship between these elements and righteousness. It is difficult to claim that Plato thought 
that these faculties could be anything but ethical, as they engender ethical living. Wadia is 
mistaken in his claims. It is, perhaps an effort to lessen the implications of similarity between the 
two. 
11 'Sometimes sattva may prevail over rajas and tamas, at others rajas over tamas and sattva, and at 
others tamas over sattva and rajas' (Mascaro, 1962, p. 67); The Bhagavadgltii Chapter 14, verse 
10. 
12 Ancient Indian scholar, said to have authored the Yoga Sutras 
13 McEvilley (2002) says this is the translation of the Sanskrit word upeksii. 
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14 McEvilley says 'In the case of India it is not controversial that the ideal of imperturbability 
dominated ethical systems of all periods' (McEvilley, 2002, p. 601). . 
15 Though I will not go into depth about the concept of 'emotion', it is useful to take note of some 
features. Nussbaum outlines particular features of 'emotions' that 'any major ancient Greek 
thinker held.' She says that emotions are not bodily reactions, but rather 'forms of intentional 
awareness' which are particularly directed at or are about some object. Emotions are thought to be 
connected to beliefs, in that beliefs are a sort of necessary condition of an emotion. Finally, 
emotions can be understood as either 'rational' or 'irrational' and also 'true' and 'false' depending 
on the beliefs they are attached to (Nussbaum, 1994, pp. 80-81). 
16 The narrow sense of 'emotion' and 'emotional' refers to a strong feeling that one may have that is 
considered to be separate from reason, or the display of such emotion, respectively. 
17 That is, McEvilley notes, aside from the practice of Yoga, which he considers as a 'distinctively 
Indian accomplishment' (McEvilley, 2002, p. 655). 
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